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CONFINING IQBAL
Allan R. Stein*
These are heady times for teachers of Civil Procedure. A recent New York Times
storyl alerted the world at large to the potentially dramatic shift in pleading law-perhaps
the most obscure corner of the generally impenetrable Civil Procedure curriculum-
brought about by the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.2 Civil
Procedure professors were instantly sought out for comment by friends and students as if
we were Jonathan Turley opining on O.J.'s culpability. Procedure wonks, accustomed to
boring our colleagues to sleep whenever we discussed our work, found our expertise in
demand in faculty lounges across the land. Not since Cliff Clavin's invocation of
Pennoyer v. Neff have we been as close to a national conversation. 4
I hate to spoil the party, but I am going to try to defuse some of the sense that the
law has been fundamentally altered by Iqbal. This article will argue that although the
decision may be read broadly and as a dramatic extension of prior law, it also lends itself
to a much narrower construction. The substantive law controlling the defendants'
immunity in that case made the grant of defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state
claim a particularly appropriate disposition. The case is thereby amenable to a limiting
construction that may serve to constrain its impact beyond its peculiar context.
This is not to deny that there are big changes afoot in the law of pleading. Less
than two years before the Iqbal decision, the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation
v. Twombly5 destabilized a well-established regime of liberal notice pleading and invited
courts to begin scrutinizing the pleadings for factual sufficiency. I, along with many
procedure scholars,6 consider that to be a very wrong-headed and dangerous approach.
* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Camden. I am grateful for the many wonderful suggestions of
friends and colleagues, including Linda Bosniak, Perry Dane, Michael Dorf, Robin Effron, Jay Feinman, Steve
Friedell, Harry Litman, David Shapiro, Rick Swedloff, Bob Williams, Tobias Wolff, and Jerry Valdostegui.
Alex Gross provided research assistance.
1. Adam Liptak, Sidebar: 9/11 Case Could Bring Broad Shift on Civil Suits, N.Y. Times A 10 (July 21,
2009).
2. 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4. Cheers, "Where There's a Will" (Natl. Broad. Co. Dec. 12, 1983) (TV series) ("I don't want to
pronounce judgment too hastily Coach, but well, yeah, I think there is a precedent in the case of Pennoyer v.
Neff when it was found jurisprudence is the better part of diction."); see generally Jurisdiction is the Better
Part of Diction, http://thelongestlistofthelongeststuffatthelongestdomainnameatlonglast.com/cliffclavinl 5.html
(last accessed Feb. 1, 2010).
5. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
6. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
Iowa L. Rev. _ (forthcoming Mar. 2010) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1448796); Lonny S. Hoffiman,
Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial
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My objective here is a narrow one: Iqbal should not be read as the nail in the
notice-pleading coffin. Prior to Iqbal, courts and scholars alike found Twombly itself
somewhat quirky and inscrutable, not easily extended beyond its context. There is no
question that the most troubling aspect of Iqbal is that it seems to resolve the question of
whether Twombly can be limited to a narrow class of cases. My argument is that it does
not. A holding that provides authority for a judge to scrutinize a complaint against the
Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI for some evidentiary
basis before opening the door to discovery against them seems both eminently
reasonable and of little precedential value in other cases not involving two of the highest
officials in the federal government. Moreover, given qualified immunity, the equal
protection claims asserted against those officials were particularly tenuous and amenable
to summary disposition.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEADING IN AMERICAN PRACTICE
To explain why many scholars think Iqbal is a significant decision, I need to
briefly situate the decision within the evolution of pleading law. This story has been told
many times by other scholars9 and I have little to add to their account.
First, for those not paying attention in their first year, "pleadings" are the initial
documents filed with the court that lay out the respective positions of the parties. Current
practice provides for a maximum of seven pleadings, 10 but most litigation involves only
two: a complaint and an answer. Plaintiff lays out the basis of his claim in the complaint
and defendant indicates which defenses he will pursue in the answer.
The central question concerning pleading practice concerns the level of detail each
party must present. For the last seventy years or so, pleading in American practice has
been dominated by the standard of "notice pleading." Under this standard, a pleading
was considered adequate if it put the opposing party on sufficient notice of the nature of
the claim or defense to enable that party to prepare its case. The pleading did not, under
B.C. L. Rev. 431, 433, 446-447 (2008); but see Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation
of Court Access, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 874 (2009) (arguing that Twombly was a modest departure from existing
pleading standards, justified by high discovery costs and the low likelihood that plaintiff had asserted a
meritorious claim); Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing after Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 9 Nev. L. J.
1, 21 (2008) ("By sweeping away Conley's 'no set of facts' standard, Bell Atlantic opens the way for the more
moderate interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) .... ); Douglas G. Smith, The Evolution of a New Pleading Standard:
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 88 Or. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1463844)
(asserting that Twombly and Iqbal increase efficiency fairness of modern civil practice); Stephen R. Brown,
Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, 43 Akron L. Rev.
_ (forthcoming 2010) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--1469638) (plausibility inquiry is not always
necessary under Twombly and Iqbal, and courts have discretion to retain deficient claims pending discovery).
7. See Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604 (2006); Keith
Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev.
Colloquy 117 (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 Green Bag 2d, 423, 438 (2007).
8. See e.g. Clermont & Yeazell, supra n. 6, at 2 ("The headline need no longer equivocate: Pleading Left
Bleeding. The U.S. Supreme Court has revolutionized the law on pleading."); Adam N. Steinman, The
Pleading Problem, 62 Stan. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2010) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442786)
("Iqbal ... [effectively] eliminated any hope that Twombly might be narrowly confined to complex antitrust
cases.").
9. See e.g. Bone, supra n. 6, at 890-898; Campbell, supra n. 6, at 9-21; Steinman, supra n. 8, at 8-11.
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) provides for a complaint, answer, answer to counterclaim, answer to crossclaim,
third party complaint, answer to third party complaint, and, if the court so orders, a reply to the answer.
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this standard, need to specify the precise nature of the claim or defense, nor did it need to
identify the evidence in support of that claim or defense. The pleadings functioned
largely as placeholders, preserving the prerogative of the parties to assert those positions
later in the litigation.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, first promulgated in 1938, were in part a
reaction to highly technical rules of pleading imposed by the common law as well as
under early statutory schemes known as the "Field Codes," named after David Dudley
Field, the attorney responsible for the first statutory reform in pleading law. Pleading at
common law and under the Field Codes was highly technical and stylized. The parties
had to specify the factual basis for its claim or defense and articulate the legal theory that
it was pursuing. Pleadings could be struck for being too conclusory, too detailed,12 too
equivocal,13 or in the wrong form. 14
Notwithstanding the complexity of Code and common law pleading, those systems
offered a "gatekeeping" function not available under more liberal pleading regimes. The
detail provided by the pleadings enabled a court to recognize legal deficiencies-wrongs
for which the law did not recognize as actionable even assuming the truth of the factual
averments-as well as factual deficiencies-the inability of the plaintiff to prove the truth
of his assertions. That functionality, however, came at a cost. A party without access to
the requisite proof would be barred from the courthouse without getting the benefit of
discovery, and technical pleading mistakes could result in a dismissal.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure simplified pleading practice
considerably, but also sacrificed some of the functionality of the earlier pleading
regimes. Under Rule 8(a), a "claim for relief' need only contain: "a short and plain
statement of the grounds of the court's jurisdiction . . ; a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .; and a demand for the relief
sought." A set of official form complaints appended to the Rules suggested that a much
abbreviated, conclusory set of allegations would suffice. 15
Until Twombly, the classic statement of the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule
8(a) was found in Conley v. Gibson,16 in which the Court held that a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief" 1 7 The Court reasoned that " 'notice pleading' is made possible by the liberal
opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to
disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly
the disputed facts and issues." 18 In other words, the Court had largely abandoned any
"gatekeeping" function of the pleadings. Unlike pleading practice under the prior
11. Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57
Colum. L. Rev. 520 (1957); Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading 150 (West 1928).
12. Id. at 150; Weinstein, supra n. 11.
13. Id.; Clark, supra n. 11, at 150.
14. Id; Weinstein, supra n. 11.
15. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 11, Complaint for Negligence ("on date, at place, the defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff').
16. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
17. Id. at 45-46.
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regimes, the federal courts could generally not, after Conley, determine either factual or
legal sufficiencyl 9 by examining the pleadings in isolation.
Taken literally, the "no set of facts" standard of Conley would have drained the
pleadings of even the modest "notice" functionality intended by the drafters and
embraced by the Conley Court.20 A complaint that alleged only that "the defendant
wronged me" would technically suffice. It is not, therefore, surprising that the lower
courts almost immediately made clear that the "no set of facts" language was not to be
taken literally.21 Unfortunately, that minor act of hyperbole by the Conley Court sowed
the seeds of its demise.22
TWOMBLYAND THE REVIVAL OF FACT PLEADING
In 2007, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Conley in Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly,23 holding that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless plaintiff alleged "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Citing the long line of cases that declined to follow the "no set of
facts" standard,2 4 the Court concluded that Conley was no longer good law.25 The
decision did not cite a single case in which the Court subjected a pleading to a test of
plausibility (or any other test of factual sufficiency) pursuant to Rule 8.26 One has the
distinct sense that the Court threw out the baby with the bathwater. Rather than simply
raising the level of detail required to provide adequate notice to defendant, the Court
seemed to reject a notice pleading standard altogether. For the first time since the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court invited the lower courts to
scrutinize complaints for factual as well as legal sufficiency.
Twombly was brought as a consumer antitrust class action against the "Baby Bell"
companies that inherited the local phone networks after the breakup of AT&T. Plaintiffs
alleged in their complaint that the defendants had conspired with each other to prevent
competition from other companies in the market for local phone and internet service by
denying those competitors access to their switching networks. Plaintiffs also alleged that
the defendants conspired with each other to allocate the market; all defendants had
agreed not to compete with each other for customers already served by any of the other
19. If plaintiff alleged a non-actionable wrong in sufficient detail for the Court to recognize legal
insufficiency, he could plead himself out of court. However, vague or ambiguous allegations make such a
determination difficult. See e.g. Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); accord Geoffrey C.
Hazard, From Whom No Secrets Are Hid, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1665, 1685 (1998).
20. Cf Hazard, supra n. 19, at 1685 ("Literal compliance with Conley v. Gibson could consist simply of
giving the names of the plaintiff and the defendant, and asking for judgment"). Note also that additional detail
could be provided to the defendant pursuant to a motion for more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(e). Moreover, the filing of a frivolous claim would have violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, although the violation
would not have been the basis for a dismissal of the pleading.
21. See e.g. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Conley has never
been interpreted literally").
22. But see Campbell, supra n. 6 (asserting that reversal of Conley in Twombly did not herald the demise of
notice pleading).
23. 550 U.S. at 545-546.
24. Id. at 562.
25. Id. at 563.
26. The only prior use of "plausibility" was in cases in which a heightened level of pleading was imposed
by rule or statute. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra n. 6.
280 Vol. 45:277
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defendants. The Court, in a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Souter, held that both claims
were factually deficient and should be dismissed pursuant to defendants' 12(b)(6) motion
without even requiring defendants to file an answer.
In a particularly confusing passage, Justice Souter drew a distinction between
factual allegations, which the court must accept as true, and "purely conclusory
assertions" that the court should scrutinize for plausibility:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need
detailed factual allegations ... a plaintiffs obligation to provide the "grounds"
of his "entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact) ....
In applying these general standards to a § 1 claim, we hold that stating
such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to
suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it
simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.2 7
Insofar as plaintiffs had alleged that defendants entered into an agreement, and
given the Court's concession that plaintiffs' allegations of fact must be accepted as true
at this stage in the proceeding, in what sense was the allegation of conspiracy a mere
"label" or "conclusion" not entitled to a presumption of truth? Was the problem that a
"conspiracy" is simply a legal conclusion and not a description of historical events?28
Would Souter have found the allegation of conspiracy adequate if it simply contained
more detail about how the agreement was formed: e.g. "The defendants all stated that
they would sell their widgets for $20?" My hunch is that it would have made no
difference. Without an identified evidentiary basis for such an allegation, there still
would be no "reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement." 29
I would assert that the Court's understanding of the difference between an
allegation of fact and a mere conclusion lies not in the nature of the allegation or in the
27. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-556.
28. See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (2010) (available
at http://ssm.com/abstract-1452875) (arguing that Twombly's characterization of conspiracy allegation as a
"conclusion" was consistent with prior practice of Court's not assuming the truth of legal conclusions for
purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) practice).
29. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; but see Steinman, supra n. 8, at 30-35. Professor Steinman rejects the notion
that Twombly should be read to require an offer of evidence in the complaint. Such a requirement, he asserts,
would confuse the function of 12(b)(6) with Rule 56 summary judgment, would be inconsistent with the model
forms, prior precedent, and would deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity to support their claim with evidence
collected through discovery, as is guaranteed by Rule 56(f). He also notes the tension between such a reading
and the permission given by Rule 11 for a party to allege facts that "will likely have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further discovery." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. I do not disagree with any of those
observations. However, if, as the Court stated, a complaint must create a "reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence . . ." it is hard to understand how the Twombly Court was doing anything other than testing
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level of factual detail alleged, but in plaintiffs access to proof.30 A complaint that
alleged, without any identified basis, that "defendants had an agreement to all sell their
widgets for $20" is no more or less an averment of fact than an averment that "plaintiff
heard defendants say that they would all sell their widgets for $20." Yet one suspects the
Court would treat the former as a mere conclusion and the latter as an averment of fact.3 1
The only justification for that different characterization is that plaintiff is suggesting a
basis of proof 32 for the latter but not the former.
As others have pointed out, requiring an offer of proof in the complaint can be a
particularly onerous requirement in the many cases in which there are information
asymmetries.33 A plaintiff who thinks that a defendant drug company marketed a drug
without warning of dangers known to the company or a plaintiff who believes he was
terminated from his job because of racial prejudice may have no evidentiary basis to
prove those allegations until he is given access to discovery. After Twombly, whether or
not the case goes forward will turn on the highly subjective question of whether a judge
believes that the unsubstantiated allegations are plausible. 34
Perhaps the best illustration of the dangers of a judge making a plausibility
determination without the benefit of discovery or any factual record is found in Twombly
itself. Commentators tend to lump together the two claims in Twombly as similar
problems of inferring wrongful conduct from the "parallel conduct" of competitors. 35
30. Cf Campbell, supra n. 6, at 26 (suggesting that Twombly is consistent with the practice in antitrust
cases of requiring pleadings to contain "allegations from which an inference fairly may be drawn by the district
court that evidence on these material points will be available and introduced at trial") (quoting Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller et al, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1216 at 227 (West 2009)); but see Robert
G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 Notre Dame L.
Rev. , 18 (forthcoming 2010) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1467799) (arguing that distinction
between legal conclusion and factual averment is based on the level of factual specificity alleged); Steinman,
supra n. 8, at 7 ("an allegation is conclusory only when it fails to identify adequately [the real-world] acts or
events that entitle the plaintiff to relief from the defendant"); Brown, supra n. 6, at 26 (an allegation is
conclusory "when the allegation attempts to plead directly an element of a claim that is only indirectly sensory-
perceptible").
3 1. Cf Brown, supra n. 6, at 30 (Twombly plaintiffs would have adequately averred a conspiracy had they
alleged that "the CEOs of each of the [ILECS] reserved a private room at a high-priced restaurant in Bermuda
in January 1996 and hatched their conspiratorial scheme [over] cigars and single-malt scotch."); Ettie Ward,
The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes? 82 St. John's L. Rev. 893, 917 (2009)
(noting that Twombly conflates summary judgment standard with pleading standard).
32. Averments in the pleadings are not, of course, evidence. When I refer to "proof," I mean that the court
is looking to the pleading for a description of the evidentiary basis that a plaintiff intends to rely upon to
establish an entitlement to relief.
33. Bone, supra n. 30, at 33 (noting how factual scrutiny of a complaint at the pleading stage can result in
dismissal of meritorious claims where defendant has exclusive access to information); Spencer, supra n. 6, at
493-494; Lonnie S. Hoffman, supra n. 6, at 1261; A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the
Post-Conley Era, 52 How. L.J. 99, 160-161 (2008) (arguing that the application of the Twombly standard in
civil rights cases is unfair since "claimants often lack direct evidence of an official municipal policy or of
discriminatory motivation").
34. Cf Hartnett, supra n. 28, at 499 ("Different judges with different life experiences can be expected to
view plausibility differently because they have a different understanding of what is ordinary, commonplace,
natural, or a matter of common sense."). Professor Hartnett proposes that judges can soften the impact of
Twombly by delaying the disposition of the Rule 12 motion until the parties have conducted discovery.
35. See Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of
Twombly and Iqbal, 51 Win. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010) (available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1522171); Bone, supra n. 6, at 884-885 (plaintiffs' "allegations describe a state of
affairs that is not merely consistent with lawful competition, but fits neatly within the normal baseline of
conduct expected from a vigorously competitive telecommunications market"); Steinman, supra n. 8, at 14
Vol. 45:277282
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However, the Court's dismissal of the second claim was far more problematic than its
dismissal of the first claim. The Court denied the plausibility of the claim that there was
a concerted refusal to provide network access to other phone and intemet companies by
noting that each defendant would have had an incentive to deny network access to
competitors even in the absence of an agreement. 36 Thus, the historical events alleged by
plaintiffs did not suggest any wrongdoing on defendants' part. It was possible that there
was a conspiracy, but the complaint demonstrated no basis to draw such an inference.
Although reasonable minds may differ as to whether that level of factual scrutiny at the
pleading stage is desirable, it seems that courts would uniformly conclude that plaintiffs
have failed to identify any suspicious facts in support of that claim.
Far more troubling is the Court's dismissal of the second claim that defendants
agreed not to compete in each other's territory. In contrast to the first claim, one would
expect competitors, in the absence of an agreement, to compete for each other's
customers. Indeed, the complaint quoted a telephone company executive acknowledging
that such competition "might be a good way to turn a quick dollar." 37 So the defendants'
forbearance from seeking customers in adjacent markets at least suggests the existence of
a conspiracy; that behavior would be economically rational if it was a quid pro quo for
keeping potential competitors out of their own markets.38 Yet the Court found even those
allegations insufficient to establish plausibility:
[Defendant's behavior] was not suggestive of conspiracy, not if history teaches anything.
In a traditionally unregulated industry with low barriers to entry, sparse competition among
large firms dominating separate geographical segments of the market could very well
signify illegal agreement, but here we have an obvious alternative explanation. In the
decade preceding the 1996 Act and well before that, monopoly was the norm in
telecommunications, not the exception.... The [defendant companies] were born in that
world, doubtless liked the world the way it was, and surely knew the adage about him who
lives by the sword. Hence, a natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the
former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors to
do the same thing.3 9
In other words, even though defendants' actions might look suspicious, the "natural
explanation" is that these particular defendants were unusually wary of competition.
There is thus no need to waste everyone's time with discovery and trial when the obvious
explanation is staring us in the face. One can imagine a similar account of an allegation
that a pharmaceutical company marketed a drug without warning of known dangers:
If history teaches us anything, it is that drug companies face enormous liability by failing
to disclose known dangers of their products. Given the potential of large product liability
awards, not to mention criminal penalties imposed by the FDA, it is simply not plausible to
suggest that any rational company would purposely conceal such information. The natural
(noting that the Twombly complaint merely alleged non-actionable parallel conduct and a "bare assertion of
conspiracy") (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
36. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566.
37. Id. at 568 n. 13.
38. But see Bone, supra n. 6, at 885 (arguing that "there is nothing necessarily odd" about noncompetitive
conduct in the telecommunications industry).
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explanation for the defendant's failure to warn was that they simply were not aware of the
risk of injury suffered by plaintiff.
In both examples, the court assumes a defendant would pursue a strategy of long-
term rationality in lieu of short-term expediency. One has the sense in both cases that the
judge may have reached a contrary conclusion if he had a different history teacher or a
slightly different take on human behavior or economics. In both cases, the courts'
preference for the innocent explanation over the culpable explanation seems quite
arbitrary and significantly influenced by the courts' predispositions.
Testing a complaint for "plausibility" thus has two deep process flaws. First,
plausibility is a very amorphous standard. Although Justice Souter locates "plausibility"
on the standard-of-proof continuum somewhere between "possibility" and
"probability," 40 the innocent account of defendants' non-competitive behavior does not
seem to be a significantly better explanation than the culpable one. If I were a bookie, I
would lay fairly even odds. If Justice Souter would do the same, that belies his assertion
that the judge is not testing for probability.
The imprecision of the standard is compounded by the second, deeper process
flaw: the judge at the pleading stage has no evidentiary record to inform his assessment
of plausibility. To go back to my bookie example, before I would lay odds on whether a
defendant acted out of long-term prudence or short-term expedience, I would want to
know a lot more information about the trade practices in the particular industry,
enforcement patterns, the risk of apprehension, the potential profitability of illegal
behavior, not to mention the financial exigencies of the defendants and their
psychological proclivities. To allow a judge to make those determinations based on his
own sense of history and human behavior without the benefit of an adversarial
presentation of the facts is the precise definition of prejudice: he is pre-judging, without
regard to the evidence.
If there is any silver lining to Twombly, it is that the decision is so analytically
incoherent as to limit its extension to other cases. The Court seems to endorse the notice
objective of pleading under the rules, 4 1 yet it obviously was demanding more. The Court
accepts the obligation of the courts to assume the truth of plaintiffs' factual averments, 4 2
yet it rather arbitrarily labels averments that it chooses not to find plausible as mere
"conclusions." 4 3 The Court asserts that it is not imposing "a probability requirement at
the pleading stage,"44 yet its disposition of the second claim seems to impose at least that
high a burden. Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of Justice Souter's opinion is that he
found a particularly strong need for an early determination of the factual sufficiency of
antitrust complaints where the scope and expense of discovery were particularly high4 5
(while denying that he was imposing a heightened burden of pleading in such cases). 4 6
There was thus reason to hope that the case might be limited to its facts.
40. Id. at 545.
41. Id. at 555.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 557.
44. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566.
45. Id. at 558-559.
46. Id. at 569 n. 14.
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That hope was further raised when, shortly after issuing the decision in Twombly,
the Court reversed the lower court's grant of defendants' 12(b)(6) motion in Erickson v.
Pardus.47 Plaintiff alleged that he contracted Hepatitis C while incarcerated in Colorado
and sought treatment from prison officials. The officials placed Erickson on a yearlong
treatment program but suspended treatment after concluding that Erickson was using
illegal drugs during his treatment. Erickson sued, alleging that the refusal of prison
officials to treat the Hepatitis C caused irreversible damage to his liver, thereby
threatening his life if left untreated. He brought the claim as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 48
The district court dismissed Erickson's complaint and the Court of Appeals
affirmed on the basis that Erickson had made "only conclusory allegations to the effect
that he has suffered a cognizable independent harm as a result of his removal from the [ ]
treatment program."49 The Supreme Court reversed the grant of defendants' 12(b)(6)
motion. 50 Reiterating its commitment to notice pleading under Rule 8, the Court
concluded that a complaint need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." 5 1 That standard was easily satisfied here,
and the dismissal of his claim "depart[ed] in so stark a manner from the pleading
standard mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" as to warrant a summary
reversal without remand. 52
The lower courts, predictably, found Twombly to be quite inscrutable, 53
particularly in light of Erickson. The Third Circuit concluded that plausibility was now
an element of Rule 8 and should not be confined to antitrust cases, but that the decision
"leaves us with the question of what it might mean." 54 The Second Circuit in Iqbal v.
Hasty bemoaned that
[c]onsiderable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings
has recently been created by the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly ... . [T]he Court's explanation for its holding indicated that it intended to make
some alteration in the regime of pure notice pleading that had prevailed in the federal
courts ever since Conley v. Gibson ... was decided half a century ago. The nature and
extent of that alteration is not clear because the Court's explanation contains several, not
entirely consistent, signals .... 55
Several studies found the rate of dismissals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) was not
significantly affected in the wake of Twombly. 56
47. 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
48. Id. at 89-93.
49. Id. at 92-93 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 198 Fed. Appx. 694, 698 (10th Cir. 2006)).
50. Id. at 94.
51. Id. at 93 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
52. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 90.
53. Cf A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6-9 (2009).
54. Phillips v. Co. ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008).
55. 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2007).
56. Kendall W. Hannon, Student Author, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1811 (2008); cf Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically? 59 Am. U. L. Rev. 553
(forthcoming 2010) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1487764) (an empirical study suggesting that the
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And then the other shoe dropped.
THE IQBAL DECISION
Ashcroft v. Iqbal7 was a Bivens58 action brought on behalf of two Pakistani and
Egyptian citizens who, in the wake of 9/11, had been arrested for reasons apparently
unrelated to terrorist activities. 59 Plaintiffs sought damages from the Attorney General
and the Director of the FBI.60 Prior to Supreme Court review, the claim by the Egyptian
plaintiff was settled, leaving only the claim by Iqbal.61 Iqbal was arrested in November
2001,62 less than two months after the attacks on the World Trade Centers, and was
detained in maximum security conditions in Brooklyn for 150 days before being released
into the general prison population63 and then deported to Pakistan for immigration law
violations.64 The complaint alleged that plaintiffs had been subjected to harsh conditions
65
of confinement solely because of their race, religion, or national origin. The 284-
paragraph complaint named 35 individual defendants, including claims against the
Attorney General and Director of the FBI in their personal capacity, and sought redress
for a wide range of abusive practices, from the use of excessive violence66 to denial of
adequate medical care67 to denial of the right to read the Koran. 6 8 However, only eight
paragraphs of the complaint specifically refer to Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI
Director Mueller, and those allegations are frustratingly vague:
10. Defendant JOHN ASHCROFT is the Attorney General of the United States. As
Attorney General, Defendant ASHCROFT has ultimate responsibility for the
implementation and enforcement of the immigration and federal criminal laws. He is a
principal architect of the policies and practices challenged here. He authorized, condoned,
and/or ratified the unreasonable and excessively harsh conditions under which Plaintiffs
were detained.
11. Defendant ROBERT MUELLER is the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). As FBI Director, he was instrumental in the adoption, promulgation, and
implementation of the policies and practices challenged here.
69. The policy of holding post-September-1 1th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
57. 129 S.Ct. 1937.
58. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A "Bivens
action" refers to a claim brought as an implied constitutional cause of action, as opposed to one brought as a
statutory claim, for instance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
59. Iqbal, the Pakistani, was charged with immigration law violations. The complaint does not allege the
reasons for the Egyptian's arrest, but the trial court identified Elmaghraby was "charged with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1029 (producing/trafficking in a counterfeit device)." Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, 2005 WL 2375202, *1
n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
60. Id.
61. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 147.
62. See PI.'s Ist Amend. Compl. at 1 80, Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202 (available at 2004 WL 3756442).
63. Id. at 9, 81.
64. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring) (noting that lqbal was "apparent[ly] subsequent[ly]
deport[ed]").
65. Pl.'s Ist Amend. Compl., supra n. 62, at 13.
66. IdatJ111l-126.
67. Id. at 1 82, 178, 187-190.
68. Id. at $J 153, 158.
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confinement until they were cleared by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT
and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September II, 2001.
73. Officials at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., were aware that the BOP relied on
the FBI classification to determine whether to detain prisoners in the ADMAX SHU at the
MDC.
74. Nonetheless, Defendants ASHCROFT, MUELLER, and ROLINCE never imposed
deadlines for the clearance process, and many detainees were held in the ADMAX SHU
even after they were approved for release to the general population unit by the FBI.
96. Defendants ASHCROFT, MUELLER, SAWYER, RARDIN, COOKSEY, HASTY,
ZENK, THOMAS, SHERMAN, LOPRESTI, and SHACKS each knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject Plaintiffs to these conditions of confinement as
a matter of policy, solely on account of their religion, race, and/or national origin and for
no legitimate penological interest.
97. Defendants ASHCROFT, MUELLER, SAWYER, RARDIN, COOKSEY, HASTY,
ZENK, THOMAS, SHERMAN, and LOPRESTI willfully and maliciously designed a
policy whereby individuals such as Plaintiffs were arbitrarily designated to be confined in
the ADMAX SHU without providing any individual determination as to whether such
designation was appropriate or should continue.
195. Defendants ASHCROFT, MUELLER, ROLINCE, MAXWELL, SAWYER,
RARDIN, COOKSEY, HASTY, ZENK, THOMAS, SHERMAN, LOPRESTI,
BARRERE, BECK, BLEDSOE, CUCITI, CUSH, GUSSAK, MUNDO, ORTIZ, TORRES,
ALAMO, CHASE, CLARDY, COTTON, DEFRANCISCO, DIAZ, JAIKISSON,
MOORE, OSTEEN, PEREZ, ROSEBERRY, SHACKS, LORENZO, and DOE Nos. 1-19
were aware of, approved of, and willfully and maliciously created these unlawful
conditions of confinement.69
The complaint thus fails to specify the precise "practices" or "conditions" of
confinement that are attributable to the actions of Ashcroft and Mueller, as opposed to
conditions that were either unauthorized or were the result of policies adopted lower
down in the administrative chain of command. 70 Plaintiffs may have meant that Ashcroft
and Mueller were directly responsible for all abusive practices (including punching Iqbal
in the stomach and denying him medical care) because they expressly ordered all of the
conditions of confinement; that Ashcroft and Mueller had supervisor liability because
they knew of all of the conditions of confinement and failed to correct them; or that
some, but not all, of the conditions of confinement were a result of the actions of
Ashcroft and Mueller. That ambiguity opened the door for the Court's narrow
construction of the complaint.
The only specific policies attributed to the actions of Ashcroft and Mueller were
the allegations of paragraphs 69, 74, and 96: that they designed the policy of holding
detainees in the maximum-security facilities without individualized hearings until
cleared of suspicion by the FBI and that they subjected detainees to these conditions of
69. Id. at 10-11, 69, 73-74,96-96, 195.
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confinement solely on account of their race, religion and/or national origin. 7 1
The complaint named Ashcroft and Mueller in only five counts: a Fifth
Amendment due process claim based on plaintiffs' confinement in a maximum security
prison; a First Amendment religious discrimination claim based on the discriminatory
treatment he suffered as a Muslim; a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim based on
the government's racial discrimination; 72 a Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim;
and a racial conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). The defendants moved
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss all claims. 74 The trial court dismissed the statutory
claims. 75 The Court of Appeals dismissed the procedural due process claim on the
ground that the illegality of placing prisoners in restrictive conditions was not
sufficiently clear at the time of Iqbal's detention to overcome defendants' qualified
immunity.76 That left only the equal protection claims on defendants' appeal to the
Supreme Court.
The 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy held that the claim against Ashcroft and
Mueller for the one policy that the complaint clearly attributes to their own actions-that
of detaining Arab Muslim men charged with immigration violations in maximum
security facilities until cleared of terrorist suspicions by the FBI-would only be
actionable only in very limited circumstances. 77 Plaintiffs must prove that such a policy
was implemented because of racial animus on the defendants' part and not because of
any "neutral, investigative reason[:]"
The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional
provision at issue. Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First
and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove
that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose . . . . Under extant precedent
purposeful discrimination requires more than "intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences" .... It instead involves a decisionmaker's undertaking a course of action
" 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' [the action's] adverse effects upon an identifiable
group." It follows that, to state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established right,
respondent must plead sufficient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and
implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for
the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.78
As I will discuss below, this is somewhat perplexing. Contrary to Justice
Kennedy's description of the claim as one charging "invidious discrimination," the
plaintiff has, in fact, alleged that the government has adopted a race-based policy for "no
legitimate penological interest." That may imply a discriminatory purpose, but it may
71. See Pl.'s 1st Amend. Compl., supra n. 62, at J 69, 74, 96.
72. The race discrimination claim was complicated by the fact that Iqbal is not an Arab. Hasty, 490 F.3d at
148 n. 2. The Court of Appeals concluded that Iqbal could still maintain a race-based challenge on the theory
that his complaint could be construed as alleging that "unlawful actions were taken against him because
officials believed, perhaps because of his appearance and his ethnicity, that he was an Arab." Id. The Supreme
Court did not discuss the matter.
73. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 149-150 n. 3.
74. See Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202 at *2 n. 3.
75. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 151.
76. Id. at 167-168.
77. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.
78. Id. at 1948-1949 (citations omitted).
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also mean that that defendants have employed a discriminatory criterion without a
compelling justification. It is not at all clear why Kennedy concluded that proof of
invidiousness was part of plaintiffs burden of proof for such a claim. 79 The courts
typically apply strict scrutiny to the government's use of racial classifications, even when
that use is apparently benign as in the affirmative action cases. 80 Yet Justice Kennedy
seems to employ a rational-relation test for constitutionality here; he seems to conclude
that if the defendants had a reasonable, race-neutral reason for using race or religion as a
measure of the dangerousness of detainees, then it is not actionable.
Had the Court applied strict scrutiny, the necessity of using a racial classification
would have presumably entered the litigation by way of defense. Plaintiff would have
stated a prima facie case by showing the fact that a racial classification was employed
and defendant would have had the burden of demonstrating that such a use was justified.
Plaintiff may have lost in the end, but he may have survived the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
By using the disparate impact standard, the Court facilitated its disposition under
Rule 12(b)(6): once the Court concludes that invidious motive was an essential element
of plaintiffs claim, it could test for the factual sufficiency of that allegation under
Twombly.81 As in Twombly, there was an innocent account that provided more
convincing explanation of defendants' behavior than racial animus-defendants were
focusing their investigation and detention policy on persons who had a greater likelihood
of a connection to al Qaeda:
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted
themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al
Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim - Osama bin Laden - and composed in large
part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to
the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the
purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respondent
alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his
nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States
and who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts. As between that
"obvious alternative explanation" for the arrests . . . and the purposeful, invidious
discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.82
Plaintiff alleged no other basis for a conclusion that defendants acted out of a
discriminatory motivation, and the absence of such a basis meant that the complaint
79. Plaintiff clearly did not help his cause in this regard. Instead of arguing that no showing of
discriminatory animus is required where the government has employed a racially-based classification, his brief
to the Court of Appeals argues that he had adequately alleged discriminatory animus to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal. See Br. for PI. Appellee Javaid lqbal at 108, Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (available at 2006 WL 5234423)
("an allegation of discriminatory motive is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)"). The
closest he comes to the argument that this was not a disparate impact case was his assertion that plaintiffs
complaint was not simply that those persons deemed to be of "high interest" happened also to be Muslim and
of similar race and national origin. It was that they were deemed to be of "high interest" and confined in the
ADMAX SHU solely because of their race, national origin, and religion. Id. at 1-2.
80. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-271 (2003).
81. See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.
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failed to make a "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' under Rule 8(b) and must
be dismissed pursuant to defendant's 12(b)(6) motion. 83
As I mentioned above, the most troubling aspect of Iqbal is the Court's rejection of
plaintiffs suggestion that Twombly should be read as limited to the antitrust and/or
complex litigation context. The Court unequivocally rejected this suggestion:
Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the
decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8 . . . . That Rule in turn
governs the pleading standard "in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
district courts." . . . Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for "all civil
actions," . . . and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike. 4
To the consternation of Justice Souter, the Iqbal Court treats the complaint as
though it were only complaining of discriminatory acts of commission by the defendants
alleged in paragraph 69 and ignored the potential liability of defendants incurred by
virtue of their failure to supervise adequately the discriminatory actions of their
subordinates. Indeed, Justice Souter goes as far as to assert that the Court has, by
implication, eliminated supervisory liability altogether for all Bivens claims.86 Justice
Souter did not explain why a failure to supervise could establish discriminatory intent on
defendants' part, and his opinion seems, to Justice Kennedy, to miss the point. Justice
Kennedy did not constrain the existence of supervisory liability generally, but only in
regard to claims of intentional discrimination; insofar as Ashcroft and Mueller were only
charged with intentional discrimination, that intentionality must be their own, not that of
their subordinates. That intentionality presumably could be established either through
their own discriminatory policy or through knowledge of and indifference to their
subordinate's discriminatory conduct. However, unlike the allegations against other
supervisory defendants, plaintiffs had not even alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller had
knowledge of the specific acts of wrongdoing by the lower level officials, let alone
knowledge that these acts had a discriminatory motive.88
The dissent by Justice Souter, the author of Twombly, seems somewhat
disingenuous. Rejecting defendant's argument that the claims against the Attorney
General and Director Mueller were not plausible, Justice Souter insisted that defendants
83. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 12.
84. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 1957-1958 (Souter, J. dissenting).
86. "Lest there be any mistake, in these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory
liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely." Id. at 1957 (Souter, J. dissenting).
87. The majority opinion might be read as foreclosing such proof in Justice Kennedy's statement that
"respondent believes a supervisor's mere knowledge of his subordinate's discriminatory purpose amounts to
the supervisor's violating the Constitution. We reject this argument." Id at 1949 (emphasis added). However, a
careful reading of that paragraph demonstrates that Justice Kennedy was simply emphasizing the need to
demonstrate discriminatory intent on the part of defendants. Their mere knowledge of discriminatory intent by
subordinates would not "amount to" a violation of the Constitution because the supervisor's tolerance of their
misconduct does not establish that his tolerance itself was motivated by discriminatory intent. That does not
mean, however, that tolerance of wrongdoing is not actionable if driven by a discriminatory motive, and it does
not mean that knowledge of a subordinate's discriminatory behavior is not probative the supervisor's motive.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy conceded that "[t]he allegations here, if true, and if condoned by petitioners, could be
the basis for some inference of wrongful intent on petitioners' part." Id. at 1952.
88. Plaintiffs' had made such specific allegations against the prison warden. See Pl.'s Ist Amend. Compl.,
supra n. 62, at fT 77.
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(and presumably the majority) had completely distorted the "plausibility" determination
required by Twombly:
Ashcroft and Mueller argue that these allegations fail to satisfy the "plausibility standard"
of Twombly. They contend that Iqbal's claims are implausible because such high-ranking
officials "tend not to be personally involved in the specific actions of lower-level officers
down the bureaucratic chain of command.".... But this response bespeaks a fundamental
misunderstanding of the enquiry that Twombly demands. Twombly does not require a court
at the motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true.
We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as true, no matter
how skeptical the court may be. . . .The sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that
are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the
plaintiffs recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel. That is not what we have
here.89
Whether the Court's presumption that Attorney General Ashcroft had clean hands was
less justified than Justice Souter's presumption that the Baby Bells had a natural aversion
to competition is rather questionable. But what is clear beyond any question is that
plaintiffs' averments in both cases were not in the same legal universe as "claims about
little green men, or the plaintiffs recent trip to Pluto."90 Did Justice Souter really think
that the allegations of conspiracy in Twombly were "sufficiently fantastic to defy reality
as we know it[?]" 9 1 A simple acknowledgment that he had not adequately thought
through the implications of Twombly would have been far more convincing.92
Notwithstanding that Justice Souter doth protest too much, there is a subtle but
potentially troubling distinction in the role that plausibility served in Twombly and how it
is at least described in Iqbal. The requirement Twombly imposes upon the pleader is to
aver evidence from which a finder of fact could infer the pleader's legal entitlement.9 3
Where plaintiff avers direct evidence of a fact-"I saw the light turn green"-that is the
end of the matter. There is no need for a plausibility determination. 94 The court must
engage in a plausibility analysis only when the pleader avers evidence that simply
implies the fact in question-"the light must have been green because all of the traffic was
moving through the intersection." 95 The court must then determine whether the evidence
averred creates a plausible inference. This is simply a corollary to the proposition that the
pleader must aver evidence; if an averment does not tend to establish the truth of the
proposition for which it is offered, it is not evidence.96 Thus, plausibility in Twombly
89. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Even if Justices Souter and Breyer had joined the dissent in Twombly, there still would have been five
votes for the majority position there. Their apparent change of heart in Iqbal would not have made much
difference had it come earlier. See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (decided with a 7-2 majority, with only Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg dissenting).
93. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
94. Cf Hartnett, supra n. 28, at 483 ("no justice interprets Twombly to empower a judge to disregard factual
allegations simply because the judge finds them implausible").
95. Cf Id. at 484-485 ("Twombly's insistence that the inference of conspiracy be 'plausible' is equivalent
to the traditional insistence that an inference be 'reasonable' .").
96. See Fed R. Evid. 401, 402 (deeming evidence inadmissible when it does not have a "tendency to make
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served the relatively modest function of testing whether the pleader has in fact averred
evidence.9 7
Justice Kennedy in Iqbal describes the holding of Twombly as creating a two-part
inquiry: a pleading must allege facts and not conclusions and the allegations must be
"plausible."
[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings
that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported
by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.98
Notice the subtle difference: plausibility is not simply a measure of whether the
plaintiff has created a permissible inference; rather, it is a freestanding inquiry into
whether the pleader's claims in toto are plausible. Thus, even in a case in which plaintiff
has averred direct evidence of his entitlement to relief, the court would still consider
whether he has made out a plausible claim. If there was tension in Twombly between the
Court's concession that averments of fact must be accepted as true and its scrutiny of
"conclusions" for plausibility, that tension approaches an outright contradiction in Iqbal.
What does it mean for a court to accept as true the factual allegations that give rise to an
actionable claim but then further require the complaint to state a plausible claim? Is that
not tantamount to rejecting the truth of the plaintiff s factual averments?
I suspect that this expansion of the plausibility inquiry was not intentional.
Separating the two questions in Iqbal itself simply appears redundant. 99 As in Twombly,
the Court's characterization of the allegation of intentional discrimination as a "legal
conclusion" has nothing to do with it not being an allegation of fact, i.e. the fact of
defendants' motive.100 What is missing is an offer of proof: on what basis does plaintiff
intend to prove defendants' discriminatory motive? The second inquiry into the
"plausibility" of the allegation thus simply restates the first inquiry: on what basis can
plaintiff prove that defendants had a discriminatory motive? Since plaintiff lacks an
adequate evidentiary basis, his allegation is considered conclusory and thus implausible.
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY-THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
Justice Kennedy emphasizes that to sustain their claims against Ashcroft and
Mueller, plaintiff must show that defendants violated a "clearly established legal
probable than it would be without the evidence").
97. There may, as Justice Souter suggests, be a second function to the plausibility scrutiny; in extreme cases
"that defy reality as we know it[,]" a judge might find a plaintiff's offer of proof "so fantastic" as to not warrant
an assumption of truth. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1959 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, neither Iqbal nor Twombly
involved such a process, and Justice Souter does not cite any cases in which the court simply disbelieved
plaintiff's factual assertions in evaluating the propriety of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
98. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
99. Cf Bone, supra n. 30, at 22-23 (arguing that two inquiries amount to same question of whether the
claim is plausible).
100. Cf Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 433,468 (1986) ("state of mind is undoubtedly a fact").
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duty." 10 1 This is a consequence of defendants' qualified immunity. As federal executive
officials, defendants are immune from damages claims for all actions taken in course of
their duties except for actions that violated clearly established legal obligations.102 This
factor, I assert, colored every other aspect of the decision, from the Court's statement of
the equal protection constraints on defendant's conduct to their understanding of Rule
8(b) and the role of Rule 12(b)(6).
103Official immunity is a doctrine of federal common law. It has the two-fold
objective of encouraging participation in public service and protecting the public by
insulating important officials from the distraction of defending unfounded lawsuits.104
Unlike other limitations on liability such as res judicata or accord and satisfaction, the
immunity defense is expressly designed to relieve the defendant from the burden of
litigation and not simply the cost of a damage award. 105
There is a long history of the courts adapting procedural practices to serve the
unusual need for an expedited assessment of the qualified immunity defense. Thus, in
Saucier v. Katz, the Court found that a federal officer was entitled to summary judgment
on the question of whether his alleged use of excessive force against a political protestor
violated a clearly established duty. Although one would normally expect that type of
context-dependent determination to made by a jury after trial, that remedy would have
undermined a central function of qualified immunity-to relieve defendant from the
burden of litigating:
The approach the Court of Appeals adopted-to deny summary judgment any time a
material issue of fact remains on the excessive force claim-could undermine the goal of
qualified immunity to "avoid excessive disruption of overnment and permit the resolution
of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment."
It is for the same reason that the trial court's denial of defendants' motion to
dismiss in Iqbal on the ground of official immunity qualified for interlocutory appellate
review pursuant to the "collateral order" doctrine. 10 8 Pursuant to the "final judgment
rule,"1 09 the Court of Appeals normally has jurisdiction over a case only when the lower
court's disposition "leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment." 110 The
courts have construed this statutory requirement quite strictly in the interest of
consolidating appellate proceedings and avoiding unnecessary appeals on questions that
might be mooted by subsequent developments in the lower court proceeding.1 11
101. To be clearly established, the obligation must have been set forth either by a Supreme Court decision or,
at minimum, by the controlling authority in the jurisdiction where the conduct occurred or a "consensus of
cases of persuasive authority." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 604 (1999).
102. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945-946.
103. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 493-499 (1896) (basing official immunity on the common law and
public policy).
104. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-819 (1982).
105. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001).
106. Id. at 209.
107. Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
108. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1945-1947.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) provides that "[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . .
110. Catlin v. U.S., 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
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Outside of very limited statutory11 2 and Rule-based 1l3 provisions for interlocutory
appeals, there is only one judicially-craftedll4 exception to the final judgment rule: the
collateral order doctrine. Pursuant to that doctrine, the Court of Appeals may review a
decision that "appears to fall in that small class which finally determine[s] claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be . . .
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.""l 5 Ever since first carving out the
exception in 1949,116 the Court has systematically narrowed its application. 117 The list
of important rulings that might appear to satisfy that standard but do not qualify as
collateral orders is large: discovery orders,118 res judicata defenses,119 jurisdictional
defenses,120 and settlement agreements.121 One of the only remaining grounds for appeal
pursuant to the doctrine is the lower court's denial of a motion to dismiss because of
official immunity. The need to quickly extricate a governmental defendant from baseless
litigation is more important than the policies advanced by the final judgment rule.
It makes little sense for the Court to rig the substantive liability rules, interlocutory
appeals standards, and summary judgment practice, all to provide officials with an
opportunity to extricate themselves from the litigation at the outset if all it takes to keep
that official in the litigation is a conclusory pleading that the official acted in deliberate
disregard of his legal obligations. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia at one point imposed a heightened pleading requirement to defeat a qualified
immunity defense specifically for this reason.122 In Crawford-El v. Britton, the Supreme
Court rejected imposing a heightened burden ofproof on plaintiffs seeking to overcome
a qualified immunity defense but expressly suggested requiring supplemental pleading
with specificity before a plaintiff was given access to discovery:
When a plaintiff files a complaint against a public official alleging a claim that requires
proof of wrongful motive, the trial court must exercise its discretion in a way that protects
the substance of the qualified immunity defense. It must exercise its discretion so that
officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery or trial proceedings.
The district judge has two primary options prior to permitting any discovery at all. First,
the court may order a reply to the defendant's or a third party's answer under Federal Rule
motion to dismiss based on a settlement agreement "does not come within the narrow ambit of collateral
orders").
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006) ("All Writs Act").
113. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), 23(f) (providing for interlocutory review of class certification decisions). The
authority of the Court to expand rule-based interlocutory practice was enhanced by the 1990 enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 2072(c), which gives the Supreme Court the rule-making authority to define what constitutes a final
judgment.
114. The Court justified the collateral order exception as a construction of "final judgment" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
115. Id. at 546.
116. Id.
117. See generally Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Practice, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1237 (2007).
118. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risiord,
449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981).
119. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006).
120. See e.g. Lauro Lines, S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (denying motion to dismiss based on
forum selection clause); Chapple v. Levinsky, 961 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1992) (transfer of venue order); Van
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988) (denying aforum non conveniens motion).
121. Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 865.
122. Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dept., 812 F.2d 1425, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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of Civil Procedure 7(a), or grant the defendant's motion for a more definite statement
under Rule 12(e). Thus, the court may insist that the plaintiff "put forward specific,
nonconclusory factual allegations" that establish improper motive causing cognizable
injury in order to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment.123
The Court thus approved imposing a heightened pleading practice in cases in which
qualified immunity was at issue even after it generally disapproved of raising the
pleading standards on an ad hoc basis five years earlier in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit. 24
As I will show below, the presence of qualified immunity in Iqbal had an
enormous impact on how the Court measured plaintiffs burden of proof, but it also
clearly colored the Court's decision to extend Twombly beyond the antitrust context.
Plaintiffs principal argument for limiting the reach of Twombly was that there was
particular need in antitrust and other complex litigation for the pleadings to serve a
"gatekeeping" function.125 Unless defendants in those cases could extricate themselves
from the litigation at the pleading stage, they could be subjected to the expense of
unwieldy discovery. In cases in which defendant did not face the same discovery burden,
the courts should be more willing to let a factually thin claim proceed, at least until tested
by a motion for summary judgment.126
Whatever merit that argument may have had in private litigation, it was a hard
argument to make in the context of Iqbal, as the Court clearly recognized:
Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially important in suits
where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified
immunity. The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the
concerns of litigation, including "avoidance of disruptive discovery" .... There are serious
and legitimate reasons for this. If a Government official is to devote time to his or her
duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to
require the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making
informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that
officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of
valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the
work of the Government. The costs of diversion are only magnified when Government
officials are charged with responding to, as Judge Cabranes aptly put it, "a national and
international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American
Republic."
12 7
Thus, Iqbal was the worst possible case in which to test the proposition that Twombly
should be limited to complex litigation. Not only is the whole point of qualified
immunity and the collateral order doctrine to extricate governmental defendants from
needless litigation at the earliest possible moment, but the particular defendants here, the
Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI, were perhaps the two
most important government officials in dealing with "a national and international
123. 523 U.S. 574, 597-598 (1998).
124. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
125. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
126. Id.
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security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic."' 28 It can
hardly come as a surprise that the Court was not prepared to subject them to the burden
of litigating on the basis of nothing more than plaintiffs' conjecture. They deserved at
least as much protection as corporations charged with antitrust violations.
WHY DID THE COURT REQUIRE PROOF OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT?
I want to now return to a problem I flagged earlier: given plaintiffs' allegation that
defendants used race and religion to determine the conditions of confinement for
immigration detainees, why does the Court demand proof of defendants' discriminatory
intent? Why does the Court appear to treat the case as a problem of disparate impact
rather than one in which the government has expressly used a suspect classification?
I think there are two possible accounts, one far more troubling than the other for
pleading purposes. I ultimately conclude, however, that imposing the burden of proving
invidious intent was probably justified given qualified immunity.
The problem, I think, flows from an arguable ambiguity in Kennedy's opinion:
what did he mean when he required proof of defendants' discriminatory intent? There are
two quite distinct possibilities. First, he could have meant that plaintiff must prove that
the defendants intended to impose a policy based on racial or religious classification.
"Intent" would be a bit of a misnomer in this sense. The question is really about the
policy itself, not about defendants' state of mind. Did Ashcroft and Mueller direct their
subordinates to hold Arab Muslim detainees in maximum security until cleared of
suspicion by the FBI? Or, did defendants merely instruct their subordinates to hold
suspicious individuals in maximum security until cleared by the FBI, and it just turned
out they were all Arab Muslims?1 29 This is the more troubling meaning of intent.
This would be deeply troubling because plaintiff has offered proof that the official
policy directed by defendants employed a racial or religious criterion. He has averred
that thousands of Arab Muslims have been placed in these conditions when their arrests
had no connection to terrorism. Paragraph 52 of the complaint asserts that
within the New York area, all Arab Muslim men arrested on criminal or immigration
128. Id. (citation omitted).
129. Part of the opinion supports the reading that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the policy promulgated
by defendants was race conscious: "All [the complaint] plausibly suggests is that the Nation's top law
enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the
most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity." Id. at 1952. "It should
come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because
of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even
though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims." Id. at 1951.
However, earlier the Court emphasizes the need to show bad motive on defendants' part and not simply
that they promulgated a discriminatory policy:
Under extant precedent purposeful discrimination requires more than "intent as volition
or intent as awareness of consequences." . . . It instead involves a decisionmaker's
undertaking a course of action " 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' [the action's]
adverse effects upon an identifiable group." . . . It follows that, to state a claim based on a
violation of a clearly established right, respondent must plead sufficient factual matter to
show that petitioners adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a
neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race,
religion, or national origin.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948-1949 (citations omitted).
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charges while the FBI was following an investigative lead into the September 11th attacks-
however unrelated the arrestee was to the investigation-were immediately classified as 'of
130interest' to the post-September- 11th investigation.
Whether or not the government had a good, non-invidious reason for detaining
these individuals, it would seem almost impossible for that to happen without taking the
suspects' race or religion into account.131 And if race and religion were taken into
account in deciding whom to detain, it strains credibility to suggest that this could have
happened on such a large scale without being at least tacitly approved of by defendants.
That does not prove that defendants were motivated by a discriminatory intent-they
could have believed that there was a higher probability of uncovering the al Qaeda
network by focusing on the Arab Muslim population. But it would tend to prove that race
was taken into consideration in the government's detention policy. A plaintiff in an
employment discrimination case could get to the jury to prove intentional racial
discrimination with those kind of numbers, let alone survive a 12(b)(6) motion, even if
the employer had an alternative innocent explanation.1 32
There is, however, one twist here that could render plaintiffs evidence somewhat
less probative of the official policy. An equally plausible account of the concentration of
Arab Muslims in detention is that defendants ordered the detention of citizens of Arab or
Muslim countries. Most of those individuals, not surprisingly, turned out to be Arab
and/or Muslims. While race, religion, and national origin are suspect classifications,
nationality is not. 133 This may be one reason why Justice Kennedy viewed the case as a
disparate impact problem: the impact on racial and religious minorities could have been
the consequence of race and religion neutral criteria. 134 Indeed, there may have been an
130. Pl.'s 1st Amend. Compl., supra n. 62, at 1 52. Although this allegation might have also been deemed
"conclusory" to the extent that plaintiff was not in a position to know why all the detainees were arrested, the
Court does not seem to challenge the evidentiary basis for the allegation that thousands of Arab Muslims had
been detained. The Court does not discuss the allegation of 52 at all.
131. A Justice Department report released in 2003, prior to the district court ruling in Iqbal, concluded that
the overwhelming number of detainees in New York were Pakistani men and that the FBI made little effort to
differentiate between detainees' ties to terrorism versus those picked up on unrelated charges. Off. of the
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dept. of Just., The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of A liens Held on
Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September II Attacks 69 (William S. Hein &
Co., Inc. 2004); see Dawinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the
Wartime Supreme Court's Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 Buff. L. Rev. , 11 (forthcoming
2010) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1478787); cf Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples (Cornell Leg.
Stud. Research Paper No. 09-025, Oct. 7, 2009) (available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1484978) (arguing that
Iqbal is consistent with the government's now discredited contention in the Abu Ghraib scandal that the
misconduct was the result of rogue, lower level officers and did not represent official policy).
132. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); cf Sidhu, supra n. 131, at 69-71
(reading Iqbal as rejecting the plausibility that defendants took race into consideration in promulgating the
detention policy and noting that plaintiffs proof would have been sufficient to survive summary judgment).
133. See Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment after Reno v.
AADC, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 313, 339-340 (2000) ("Distinctions in federal law among aliens on the basis of
their country of current nationality are not constitutionally suspect." (citation omitted)); accord Narenji v.
Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (upholding Presidential order that all
Iranian students in the U.S. report to the INS and demonstrate the lawfulness of their presence in the country on
the grounds that the order was not arbitrary and had a rational basis).
134. But see Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 Va. L. Rev. 951, 1002 n. 155 (2002)
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argument (apparently not asserted by these defendants)135 that the government's decision
on how and when to detain persons charged with immigration violations fell within the
executive's plenary power over immigration and was outside of judicial scrutiny all
together. 136
Nevertheless, proof of the fact of Arab Muslim detention surely has a tendency to
establish a race-based policy; a reasonable finder of fact would be more likely to accept
that there was a race-based policy after seeing evidence of its racial impact. Accordingly,
if the Court meant that plaintiff failed to set forth a plausible claim that defendants in fact
deployed a race-based policy, the burden of proving plausibility has risen exponentially.
Plaintiff may not have proved that policy beyond a reasonable doubt, but they surely
created a reasonable inference of its existence.
The other meaning of "discriminatory intent" is one that describes a state of mind,
or motive. Plaintiffs burden, under this construction, was not simply to prove that
defendants ordered the use of race-based detention policy, but that they did so out of
racial animus, and not for a legitimate purpose. Here, I think, the Court would have been
more justified in concluding that plaintiff offered no evidence of bad intent. While
Ashcroft and Mueller might be racists, their imposition of a race-based policy was not
probative of an invidious motive in these circumstances.
The problem with that construction, however, is that courts do not typically require
a plaintiff to establish an invidious motive in cases in which the government has
deployed a race-based policy.137 Indeed, those policies may be prohibited even where
government can demonstrate a completely benign motive, as in the affirmative action
cases, absent a compelling governmental interest. 138
So, does that mean that Kennedy was, in fact, dismissing the case because
plaintiffs failed to offer plausible evidence of a race-based policy and not because they
lacked evidence of racial animus? Not necessarily. There are circumstances under which
the government's use of a racial classification for investigative purposes is not
necessarily considered suspect. It is clear that government cannot act on the assumption
that members of a particular race share a proclivity for certain kinds of criminal activity.
It would hardly support the issuance of a search warrant for the police to note that the
target of the search is Italian, even if they could show that many individuals previously
convicted of organized criminal activity were Italian. The "suspicion" is based on little
more than a stereotype and is at the core of an illicit use of race. 139
135. Defendant Hasty, the warden of the prison, did assert such an argument. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 174. He was
not a party to the Supreme Court appeal. One problem with such an argument is that the conditions of
confinement were not clearly related to the regulation of immigration. Id; see Wong Wing v. US., 163 U.S.
228, 233 (1896) (striking down federal immigration law subjecting Chinese citizens deemed to be in the U.S.
illegally to "hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year, and thereafter removed from the United
States" (citation omitted)). Although acknowledging an expansive power of the federal government to regulate
immigration, the Wong Wing Court reasoned that the harsh conditions the immigrants were subjected to took
the statute out of the immigration domain and constituted a form of punishment subject to constitutional
scrutiny. Id. at 237-238.
136. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 174.
137. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
138. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
139. See Sidhusupran. 131, at 72.
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There are circumstances, however, where the government's use of race or religion
as an investigatory tools is not based on a stereotype, but on some other factor that
objectively correlates with those categories. In those cases, it is not at all clear that the
use of race as an investigatory tool is constitutionally illegitimate or even suspect.140
Indeed, there is an argument that it does not constitute use of a racial category at all. 141
This, indeed, seems to be a plausible construction of Justice Kennedy's analysis in
Iqbal. He, in effect, may have assumed the category allegedly used by the Justice
Department for determining whom to detain pending investigation was "people from the
same national and religious community as al Qaeda." That is the population that has the
highest probability of having connections with known terrorists. The correlation of that
category with Arab Muslims is merely coincidental, much in the way that using
nationality might correlate with race or religion. Thus, this is a disparate impact case, not
a suspect classification case, and plaintiff must plead and prove that defendants acted out
of an invidious motivation in order to prevail.
A similar logic was employed in Brown v. City of Oneonta.142 The police in that
case had conducted a city-wide sweep to examine the hands of all black people in the
community after the victim of an assault described the perpetrator has a young black man
with a knife cut on his hand.143 A civil rights claim asserted on behalf of the black
residents on the city was dismissed for failure to state a claim.144 Notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that the police employed a race-conscious strategy, the court concluded
that plaintiffs "have not identified any law or policy that contains an express racial
classification."1 45 The court's reasoning was that the state's use of race was for a
rational, non-invidious reason. Race simply happened to correlate with the race-neutral
justification that the perpetrator had dark skin:
Plaintiffs do not allege ... that the defendant law enforcement agencies have a regular
policy based upon racial stereotypes that all black Oneonta residents be questioned
whenever a violent crime is reported. In short, plaintiffs' factual premise is not supported
by the pleadings: they were not questioned solely on the basis of their race. They were
questioned on the altogether legitimate basis of a physical description given by the victim
of a crime. Defendants' policy was race-neutral on its face; their policy was to investigate
crimes by interviewing the victim, getting a description of the assailant, and seeking out
persons who matched that description. This description contained not only race, but also
gender and age, as well as the possibility of a cut on the hand. In acting on the description
provided by the victim of the assault-a description that included race as one of several
elements-defendants did not engage in a suspect racial classification that would draw strict
scrutiny. The description, which originated not with the state but with the victim, was a
140. See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J. 214, 242-
243 (1983) ("The use of race to identify a particular perpetrator ... does not disadvantage any racial group and
thus does not require strict scrutiny.").
141. See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. Chi. Leg. Forum 163, 175-176
(2002) (discussing U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563-564 (1976), which upheld right of Border Patrol
agents to stop and question suspected illegal aliens on basis of race).
142. 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied 534 U.S. 816 (2001).
143. Id. at 334.
144. Id. at 335-336.
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legitimate classification within which potential suspects might be found. 146
Cases like City of Oneonta are in significant tension with other non-invidious uses
of race, such as the affirmative action cases, where the courts have held that a benign
motive does not legitimate the government's employment of a racial criterion. 147 Even
benign uses of suspect classifications must be justified by a compelling state interest.148
Part of the Court's account of strict scrutiny in this context is that an apparently benign
use of a racial criterion may in fact be infected by racial attitudes. As the Court stated in
Bush v. Vera, "we subject racial classifications to strict scrutiny precisely because that
scrutiny is necessary to determine whether they are benign ... or whether they misuse
race and foster harmful and divisive stereotypes without a compelling justification."l14 9
Accordingly, there is something disturbingly circular about a court's decision to
subject a racial classification to mere rational-relation scrutiny on the ground that the use
of race was for a legitimate, non-racial reason. How did the Oneonta court know that
race played no role in the decision to examine every black person in town? If the police
would not have subjected a comparable group of white suspects to that treatment,
shouldn't that invalidate the strategy, even if it were rational?150
Nonetheless, there is sufficient legal authority for treating this kind of
"coincidental" use of a racial category as a disparate impact problem to cover Ashcroft
and Mueller with qualified immunity. As long as there was no clearly established
authority to subject this kind of policy to strict scrutiny, these defendants could not be
held liable under a strict scrutiny analysis. 15 1 Iqbal is, of course, distinguishable from the
cases in which suspects have been temporally detained for questioning on the basis of
race. Mr. Iqbal was placed in highly restrictive and uncomfortable maximum security
conditions for 150 days. A coherent equal protection approach would presumably raise
the level of constitutional scrutiny with the degree of burden imposed on the victim of
discrimination.152 But conversely, the unprecedented national security crisis to which
defendants were responding would presumably weigh heavily on the "compelling
governmental interest" side of the scales. The ultimate resolution of how those factors
balance cannot be said to be "clearly established."
A similar analysis suggests that, even had the Court employed a strict scrutiny
framework, it was not "clearly established" that taking the race of individuals charged
146. Id at 337-338; cf Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, Va., 579 F.3d 380, 389-390 (4th Cir. 2009)
(affirming dismissal of the plaintiffs equal protection claim arising out of police officers asking random
African-American men for DNA samples in connection with a search for a serial rapist).
147. See R. Richard Banks, The Story of Brown v. City of Oneonta: The Uncertain Meaning of Racially
Discriminatory Policing under the Equal Protection Clause, in Constitutional Law Stories 223 (Michael C.
Dorf ed., Ist ed, Foundation Press 2004).
148. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
149. 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996).
150. Accord Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 471 F. Supp. 2d 657 (W.D. Va. 2007) (finding that a policy of
questioning all black suspects was unconstitutional where there was no policy of questioning all white
suspects); Alschuler, supra n. 141, at 181-182.
151. Cf Farag v. U.S., 487 F. Supp. 2d 436, 469 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that federal officers would enjoy
qualified immunity for using race as a factor in deciding whether to detain Arab airline passengers because
illegality of taking race into consideration as an element of probable cause was not clearly established).
152. Cf Alschuler, supra n. 141, at 265-267 (arguing that the greater the burden on targets of racial
profiling, the greater the need for justification).
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with immigration law violations into consideration in determining the conditions of
confinement for those individuals did not serve a compelling governmental interest in the
context of 9/11. The leading Supreme Court decision closest to the facts of Iqbal is the
notorious decision in Korematsu1 53 in which the Supreme Court upheld the forced
relocation of thousands of Japanese Americans living in California into camps during
World War II. The Court held that the use of race to identify threats to national security
survived strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 154 However widely repudiated
by judges, scholars, and even Congress, 155 that decision has never been squarely
overruled by the Supreme Court1 56 and lower court decisions do not clearly undermine
the use of race as proxy for investigatory suspicion in other contexts. 157
In a passage evocative of Justice Kennedy's opinion in Iqbal,158 Justice Black
insisted that notwithstanding the government's use of race to determine who should be
placed in relocation camps, such a choice was based on a coherent defense strategy and
did not arise out of racial animus:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military
dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded
from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we
159
are at war with the Japanese Empire.
Given the qualified immunity defense, even if, today, a court would be inclined to
say that use of race as a proxy for suspicion of terrorism is not narrowly tailored to
advance the government's interest, it would be hard to argue that defendants' knew that
Korematsu was bad law for the war on terrorism.160
Thus, in light of the qualified immunity defense and the distinct possibility that
using race and religion as an investigatory tool could be considered a compelling
governmental interest in the wake of 9/11, Justice Kennedy's description of the burden
of proof on plaintiffs to establish an invidious motive on Ashcroft's and Mueller's part
seems correct. That is the only way that those defendants could have clearly violated
plaintiffs' right to equal protection.
Let me make clear that I am not endorsing such a use of "racial profiling." I am not
even claiming that it is legal. I am simply asserting that, for purposes qualified immunity,
153. 323 U.S. at 224.
154. Justice Black clearly applied strict scrutiny to the policy: "[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are
unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id. at 216.
155. See e.g. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989(a) et seq. (1988) ("a grave injustice was done to
both citizens and permanent residents of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of
civilians during World War 11" and that these actions "were motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime
hysteria, and a failure of political leadership").
156. See Pamela Karlan & Richard Posner, The Triumph ofExpedience, Harper's Mag. 31 (May 2001).
157. See generally City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329; Faraq, 587 F. Supp. 436; US. v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 174
(6th Cir. 1995) (upholding the questioning of criminal suspect when race was one element of the police's basis
for the questioning).
158. Cf Sidhu, supra n. 131, at 74 ("The Iqbal Court's justification of the targeting of Arab Muslims-that the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were themselves Arab Muslims-mirrors the same rationalization articulated by
the Court in Korematsu . . . .").
159. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
160. But see Sidhu, supra n. 131, at 75 (arguing that the wide repudiation of Korematsu created a clearly
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there was no clearly established prohibition on its use in the war on terrorism three
months after the attack on the World Trade Centers.
As I suggested earlier, had the Court applied strict scrutiny rather than a rational
relation test, it would have been harder for the Court to authorize dismissal under
12(b)(6) (although it may have done so post-answer pursuant to a Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings). The defendants' justification for employing a race-based
criterion would have presumably constituted an affirmative defense, and it would have
been incumbent on defendants to set forth and defend such a practice. But note that
qualified immunity is itself an affirmative defense, and plaintiffs are not normally
required as part of their burden under Rule 8(a) to plead facts sufficient to overcome that
defense.161 Thus the Court was already "jumping the gun" in some sense by requiring
the complaint to negate that defense at all. I suspect that had the Court applied strict
scrutiny, they could have reasoned that the existence of an arguably compelling
justification for defendants' actions is all that it would take to defeat plaintiffs claim.
Thus, there was no need to wait for the assertion of the affirmative defense in order to
determine the viability of plaintiff's claim.
CONFINING IQBAL
Whether the adage that hard cases make bad law is true, it seems in this instance
that a relatively easy one was the culprit. Plaintiffs evidence of actionable wrongdoing
by defendants in Iqbal appears much weaker than in Twombly, and the reasons for
providing an early exit strategy to them were more compelling. A careful reading of
Iqbal suggests three implications of the decision that ought to constrain its general
application.
First, even assuming that Iqbal should be read as extending the reach of Twombly
broadly, it is clear that it should have little or no impact on even similar Bivens actions.
Had the claim in Iqbal been for injunctive relief, plaintiff would have faced no qualified
immunity defense.162 That, in turn, would have fundamentally altered his burden of
proof. Similarly, had the plaintiff been asserting anything other than a discrimination
claim, the defendants' state of mind would have been far less relevant. Thus, had the
plaintiff asserted a valid due processl63 or Eighth Amendment claim, defendants would
have been liable for their imposition of illegal policies regardless of their intent
(assuming that defendant's behavior violated a clearly established legal obligation).
Second, notwithstanding the fact that Justice Kennedy teased apart the requirement
of plausibility from the prohibition on conclusory allegations, the case need not be read
to imply that courts ought to generally scrutinize pleadings for plausibility. The Court
161. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 586-587 (qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense that does not need to be negated in order for a complaint to state a claim).
162. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 734 (1980) (suggesting that
executive officers have no immunity in actions for prospective relief).
163. See Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009) (sustaining Ist, 4th and 5th Amendment claims
brought against Attorney General Ashcroft in his personal capacity for establishing a policy of detaining
citizens under the material witness statute without evidence of criminal wrongdoing); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.
Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss by former Justice Department attorney who had
authored memoranda authorizing the Bush administration's detention and treatment of enemy combatants).
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reiterates the principle that averments of fact must be accepted as true. 164 Thus, where a
plaintiff has averred direct evidence of wrongdoing, courts are obligated to accept the
truth of those allegations. Courts should scrutinize only inferential averments of evidence
for plausibility. 165
And third, Iqbal need not be read as establishing a uniform standard of
"plausibility" for testing the sufficiency of all conclusory allegations under Rule
12(b)(6). Even though the Iqbal Court construed Twombly as a construction of Rule 8
applicable to all civil actions and not limited to antitrust litigation,166 the Court does not
state that there is a uniform standard of factual sufficiency under Rule 8. Indeed, the
Court acknowledged that "plausibility" was, of necessity, a highly context-dependent
judgment: "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as
the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." 1 67
The Court of Appeals in Iqbal, while sustaining the denial of defendants' motion to
dismiss, read Twombly as providing a "flexible plausibility standard[:]"
After careful consideration of the Court's opinion and the conflicting signals from it that
we have identified, we believe the Court is not requiring a universal standard of heightened
fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible "plausibility standard," which obliges a
pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such
amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.168
The Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that reading of Twombly,169 but it never
disavowed it. The closest the Court comes to rejecting a flexible standard was its
statement "that the question presented by a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient
pleadings does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery process."1 70 This
might be read to imply that the requirement of pleading with sufficient specificity to
survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion has no connection to the cost of letting the parties
proceed to discovery. But the Court's rationale for rejecting discovery management as an
adequate substitute for pleading specificity in both Twombly and Iqbal was that
discovery management does not work:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if
groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful case management
given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery
abuse has been on the modest side. 171
In fact, the only aspect of the Court of Appeals' reasoning that the Supreme Court
took issue with was the lower court's conclusion that these defendants' could be
164. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
165. Cf Steinman, The Pleading Problem, supra n. 8, at 5 ("As long as a complaint contains non-conclusory
allegations for every element of a claim for relief, it passes muster regardless of whether the judge might label
the allegations implausible.").
166. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
167. Id at 1950.
168. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 157-158.
169. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944.
170. Id. at 1953.
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adequately protected by limited discovery and the opportunity for an early summary
judgment determination:172
It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be deferred while
pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as
to the other parties proceeds, it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to
participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted
way that causes prejudice to their position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves
subject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from the burdens of discovery. 173
In other words, the special circumstances of qualified immunity in Iqbal made it
particularly appropriate for the trial court to identify factual sufficiency in the
complaint. 174 In both Twombly and Iqbal there were special circumstances that put
greater pressure on the Court to provide an early exit opportunity for the defendant, and
the Court expressly acknowledged those pressures. In Twombly it was the
unmanageability of discovery in complex litigation; in Iqbal, it was the demands of the
qualified immunity doctrine to extricate a high government official from the burden of
litigation. In these circumstances, there was a greater need for the courts to scrutinize the
strength of any proffered inferences.
Under this reading, "plausibility" is a term of flexible meaning that varies not only
with the Court's intuitions about a plaintiff's likelihood of success, but with the necessity
of making that determination prior to discovery. Thus, where there is a less compelling
need to make an early determination of factual sufficiency, courts ought to be more
tolerant of the proffered inference. Purely conclusory allegations should never suffice,
but in some cases the courts should accept an inference that has a lesser tendency to
establish to truth of the matter than in other cases. In other words, on a scale ranging
from "possible" to "probable," the courts in some cases should accept evidence
suggesting something closer to possibility (a weak inference), and in other require the
evidence to establish something closer to probability (a strong inference). 175
Take for example the pharmaceutical hypothetical I posited in my discussion of
Twombly. Plaintiff alleges that he has been injured by defendant's drug and that
defendant failed to warn of that injury, a fact which was known to them prior to
marketing the drug. The plaintiff is implicitly asking the court to draw two inferences
essential to his case: that his injury was caused by the drug and that defendant was aware
of that risk. However, lots of people who never took defendants' drug suffer the injury
that plaintiff suffered, suggesting that his injury after ingesting the drug might well be a
coincidence. And despite even thorough testing, it is quite possible that plaintiffs drug
reaction had never been reported before. A skeptical judge might therefore be tempted to
172. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
173. Id. at 1954.
174. Id. at 1953.
175. Accord Effron, supra n. 35, at 21 ("Lower courts already have begun to use the cost of litigation aspect
of Twombly to justify the application of a heightened pleading standard by noting that discovery costs were
high in comparison to the plausibility of the allegations in the complaint."); cf Keith Hylton, When Should a
Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 S. Ct. Econ. Rev. 39,
42-54 (2008); Smith v. Dufyj, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that both Twombly and
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find the proffered inferences implausible. In such a case, a flexible plausibility standard
suggests that the judge should be less skeptical, and more open to the inferences, at least
in the absence of compelling reasons why deferring factual scrutiny until summary
judgment would be unfair.
The biggest obstacle to this understanding of plausibility is that it would represent
the imposition of heightened burden of pleadings in particular categories of cases, an
approach arguably outlawed by the Court's decisions in Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unitl76 and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.1 77
The Court in those cases held that it is inappropriate for courts to single out particular
categories of cases for a heightened pleading standard. 17 8 Leatherman curtailed the
179practice of requiring heightened pleading in Civil Rights cases and Swierkiewicz did
180the same for Title VII complaints. Any such differential treatment must be authorized
181
by the rule-making process, not by judge-made exceptions. The irony of having those
cases serve to expand Twombly is that both cases were designed to protect plaintiffs from
being singled out for a heightened pleading burden. They achieved equality by lowering
the ceiling; their use in this context would be to achieve equality by raising the pleading
floor. 182
I must admit to having a "tail wagging the dog" reaction to such an argument: do
we really need to raise the burden of pleading on everyone in order to redress a
compelling need to determine factual sufficiency in a small number of cases? It seems
like a foolish consistency. The deeper lesson of Leatherman is that courts should not
rewrite the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without the constraints of the rule-making
process. The Court seems to have violated that injunction in Twombly. It would only
compound that mistake if the Court were to require the new standard to apply to
176. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
177. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
178. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513; Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-169.
179. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
180. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 164.
181. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
182. A similar floor-raising strategy is evident in the Court's treatment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 in Iqbal. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1954. Rule 9 requires that in averring certain enumerated matters, a pleader must aver those
matters "with particularity." See e.g. Rule 9(c) (requiring denials that a condition precedent has occurred be
stated "with particularity"); Rule 9(g) (requiring that special damages "be specifically stated"). The problem for
the Court in Iqbal was that not only is intent not on the list of matters that must be stated with particularity, but
Rule 9(b) specifically exempts such allegations from such a heightened pleading requirement: "[m]alice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." Nonetheless, the Court held
that plaintiffs averment of defendants' intent to discriminate was not stated with sufficient specificity to
survive a 12(b)(6) challenge. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
The Court reasoned that it was not subjecting that averment to heightened scrutiny. Id. Rather, it was
enforcing the requirement of Rule 8(a) that a complaint set forth a "statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Id. In other words, all averments of a complaint must set forth a plausible basis;
those matters that require pleading with greater specificity under Rule 9 require a pleader to go even further in
specifying the basis for those averments. Ironically, the Court has not imposed particularly onerous pleading
requirements on plaintiffs stating certain statutory claims that must be plead with specificity. See e.g. Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). (to satisfy the requirements of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act that complaints must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind," a pleading must simply allege facts from which a
reasonable jury was at least as likely to infer a culpable state of mind as an innocent state of mind); cf Stephen
B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of General Rules, 2009 Wis. L. Rev. 535, 551-552 (suggesting that
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everyone in order to pretend that the standard in Twombly was not changed.
The best answer to the uniformity challenge, I think, is that the uniformity required
by Leatherman and Swierkiewicz is an illusion.183 The courts must, and in fact do,
distinguish the level of specificity required in a complaint depending on many variables.
Even after Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, some courts demanded that various aspects of
antitrust,184 civil rights,185 copyright,186 defamation,187 and environmentall88 claims be
stated with greater specificity than was required in simple negligence actions. And even
post-Twombly the Court reiterated its commitment to notice pleading and, in Erickson v.
Pardus, accepted uncritically conclusory assertions by plaintiffs.189 As the Second
Circuit recognized, the best account of that apparent inconsistency is that the plausibility
standard established by Twombly is, in fact, a flexible one. Only in exceptional cases
should it require courts to engage in serious factual scrutiny.
183. Professor Fairman convincingly demonstrated this reality well before Twombly and Iqbal. See
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 987 (2003) [hereinafter Fairman,
Myth]; Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 551 (2002); see e.g. Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (plaintiff in securities fraud case must allege how
his economic lass was caused by defendant's alleged fraud; mere allegation that he paid an "artificially inflated
purchase price" does not provide defendant with sufficient "notice of what the relevant economic loss might be
or of what the causal connection might be between that loss and the misrepresentation .... .").
184. See Fairman, Myth, supra n. 183, at 1013-1021.
185. See id., at 1028-1032; Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 72-73 (1st Cir. 1998); Blue v. Koren, 72
F.3d 1075, 1082-1083 (2d Cir. 1995).
186. See Fairman, Myth, supra n. 183, at 1036-1042.
187. Id. at 1042-1047.
188. Id. at 1021-1027.
189. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94.
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